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The Concept of a Pacific Community 
Kiyo血iKojima 
We may conceive of血reebasic concepts of a Pacific Community, 
each unique as a result of different areas of concern and different degrees 
of integration. 
The first concept mvolves a high degree of institutional mtegration, 
such 回世田 EuropeanEconomic Community (E.E.C.），阻dis based upon 
a customs union or, to use a name once common, a “Pacific Free Trade 
Area，” a poss1bihty that I once advocated. A free trade zone with r田tric-
tions ag垣nstnon-members is not now feaSible largely because 1t is in-
consistent with ihe commitJnent of the United States and Japan to an 
open, multilateral, global economic system. Further, since the General 
Agreement on TarifJ and Trade (GATT) has been successful in reducing 
tarifs and other trade barriers throughout the world, a free trade area m 
the Pacific is no longer of any great value. 
The second concept mvolves a much broader area of concern and re・
duced degree of integration. As Dr. Everett Kleinjans, President of也e
East-West Center, stated加 recenttestimony before the House Subcom-
m1ttee on Asian and Pacific Afi白IrS，“1t[this concept of a Pacific Com-
munity] indicates fnendly relationships among persons and mstitutions 
of diflおrentnations; it means cooperative research ventures in血e
vanous scientific, social scientific, and humarnst1c disciplines on prob・
lems of mutual concern; it means enlightened commumcatrnn beyond 
racial, national, or cultural boundaries. Certain shared values, percep-
tions, beliefs, and behavior are necessary to町1provecommunication 
叩 dcooperation ... "" 
8 
S泊世larviews are expre田edin a recent Japanese report. The late 
Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira, keen to promote也e“buildingof a 
i'acific Community，＇’ created a Pacific Basin Cooperation Study Group 
following his election in 1978, and this group recently i田ueda document 
entitled “Interim Report on the Pacific Basin Cooperation Concept. ” 
This report, ranking with the United States Senate’S OPTAD proposal as 
an important and authoritative document, observes that “The Pacific 
Basm Cooperat10n Concept, which we espouse here, 1s mtended ... to 
promote cooperatlve relations within the Pacific basin region and to take 
maximum advantage of the area’S rich potential not onlyおrthe Pacific 
basin countries but also to enhance吐ieprosperity and well-being of al 
peoples in the world.’四 Itgoes on to suggest expanded exchanges in血e
social and cultural fields to enchance mutual understanding, greater 
mutual efforts泊 scientificand technological research, and various new 
modes of economic cooperation. It does not touch upon the question 
of regional cooperation in pohtical and military matters. 
This concept of the Pacific Corr町rnmty1s too broad, making the con-
cept itself too vague and ambiguous and its objectives too diverse. The 
social and cultural bases for a Pacific Community are泊deedimportant 
and should not be neglected, but mutual understandmg and interact10n 
can be enhanced short of creating a Pacific Basin-wide framework The 
effort to butld a Pacific Community should focus on a clear-cut objec-
!lve, namely, the development of mechanisms for regional-mult世ateral
cooperat10n in the efficient utilization of undeveloped economic poten-
tial so as to further the peace and security of al the peoples in the 
region These are由emost urgent and common concerns担theuncertain 
world of the present. 
Hence, a third concept is necessary, one由atis institutionally les 
rigid than that underlying the European Economic Community but yet 
more precise than that behind由ecurrent Japanese propo坦lIt is m-
creasingly 刊 dentto me由atthe Senate’s O円＇ADproposal印 ismost 
appropriate m 也isre叩ect Although也eprecise nature of such an 
organization has yet to be defmed, it would aim at fostering regional 
economic development by encouragmg functional integration m several 
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important aspects involving certain les rigid institutional frameworks, 
the members of which would vary according白血eparticular function. 
As Professor Patrick states，叩“OPTADwould be a governmental 
orgamzation with a small administrative apparatus so as not to become 
heavily bureaucratic, with specific Task Forces to handle defined policy-
onented assigIIments, and an informal, consultative, commumcat1ve 
style of operations."'" In short, it would provide a五orumfor consulta-
tion and cooperation剖nongal the nal!ons of the region, advanced and 
developing. 
The Pacific basin, composed of the five advanced nations (United 
States, Japan; Canada, Australia and New Zealand) and the numerous 
developmg nations of Asia, Latin Amenca and Oceania, 1s a vast area 
with seemingly unlunited potential for economic development. In terms 
of population, in 1975 the total for the advanced countries was 365 
million: 213 million in the United States, 112 million in Japan, 13 
million in Australia, and 3 million in New Zealand. The Southeast Asian 
nations, led by Indonesia and followed by the Philippines, Thailand, 
Malaysia and Singapore, accounted for 235 million. In East Asia, China 
accounted for more than 900 million, while South Korea, Taiwan and 
Hong Kong added another 56 million to the total. The total in Latin 
America was approxunately 275 mtll10n, while Oceama contributed 
another 4 mtll10n. Thus the overall population of血eregion was some 
1835 million (or 1 billion 835 million) huge indeed when compared 
with Western Europe, the world’s most recent great developmental 
center, wi血 atotal comparable population of approximately 259 
m出10n
While Western Europe is more or les homogenous and umformly 
industrialized, the Pacific includes nations of very different political 
and cultural backgrounds as well as diverse economies. Some countnes 
are well endowed with natural resources while others are poorly en-
dowed. Some are econom1cally too small and others too large, and near-
ly al are different m teηns of levels of mdustrializat10n and national 
income. Yet, regardle田 ofthe difficulties these heterogeneities pose 
with respect to building a Pacific Community, there is a great potential 
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for regional integrat10n and, hence, economic development. 
While the Pacific rim countries have considerable potential for growth 
of trade and development, they have lacked the leadership and 1mtiative 
neces田ryto develop this potential A sen田 ofsolidarity and a世田ne-
work for economic cooperat10n have yet to emerge m血ePacific region. 
The United States has maintained a general attitude of “going in with 
Europe" and has tended to neglect the Pacific region. At the田metime, 
Japan, remembering the nightmare of the “Greater East Asian Co-
Prosperity Sphere，＇’ has, at least until recently, hesitated to take any 
initiatives toward bmldmg a Pacific Community. 
The model that comes first to mind for achieving these ends is, of 
course, the European Commu凶ty Active and adaptable leaders have, 
over the years, taken the initlative and built a prosperous Community 
within Europe itself and a broader Atlantic Community invol吋ngboth 
Europe and North America. The first major event in this process was the 
inaugurallon of the European Economic Community m 1958 Among 
subsequent hiゆlightswere the complete elimination of inner tarifs m 
1968; the enlargement of the community to include the United King-
dom, Ireland and Denmark in 1973; its further expans10n by means of 
special arrangements with certain African, Canbbean and Pacific nations 
under terms of the Lome Treaty of 1975; and the inauguration of世田
European Monetary System in 1979. Although血e四cesfl叫growthof 
the European Community has not been entrrely a consequence of its 
institutional mtegrallon, such integration has been a m司orfactor. This, 
as suggested earlier, may pose some problems so far as the Pacific is 
concerned. 
In the回mevein, the Organization for Econonuc Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), a group that evolved out of the Marshall Plan 
administration and now the pnncipal group concerned with global 
economic C()Operation, is sometimes cited as an organization由atmight 
be used to encourage greater cooperation in也ePacific. Appropriate as 
this suggesllon may be m theory, m practice也egroup has retamed its 
essential European-Atlantic orientation. Even after Japan, Australla 
and New Zealand became participants, its membershlp remained largely 
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European-Atlan!Jc叩dits interests and policies have continued to be 
directed toward European-Atlanl!c problems.百10interests and pro bl ems 
of the Pacific region, largely different in nature from those of the Euro-
pean-Atlantic region, have been neglected. 
This bias Is further evident in the five economic sunumt conferences 
convened by world leaders since 1975. Jud脚gfrom the particip四 ts叩d
topics of discussion, world concern remams fixed on Europe and the 
Atlantic regardless of世田potentialand the problems of the Pacific 
It seems to me血atal of this leads to the conclusion that, valuable as 
the European expenence may be as a general guide, we need our own 
unique forum in the Pacific to discuss political, cultural, and economic 
is四escommon to the region, and that the oft-mentioned OPTAD pro-
po回lcomes closest to meeting廿tisneed By now, Australra, Canada and 
New Zealand, turning their eyes away from the mother country and 
Europe, are keenly interested m peace and prospenty in the Pacific 
region. Notwithstanding the continued difficulties, industnaliza!Jon m 
developing nations has been under way at a rapid tempo, especially in the 
Asian-Pacific nat10ns South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore 
have developed into newly industrializing countries, and the other 
ASEAN countries wil reach a sirnilar stage in the not too dis阻ntfuture. 
Additionally, China has begun the modernization of her huge economy. 
Thus, both the five advanced countries and the developing nations of the 
Pacific are keen to take the initiative in establishing some kind of policy 
forum for economic cooperation among themselves. 
St町tingwi白血ASEAN-PacificForum 
It would be premature and difficult at this time to defme the formal 
membership of an OPTAD. It would be preferable to foster functional, 
rather白血institutional,integration in the region by employing a prob-
lem司by-problemapproach towards economic development and trade 
growth among the countries of the area. Moreover, since the numerous 
Pac出crim countnes cover a large area and are heterogeneous担sizeand 
nature, it would, at least at the outset, be more realistic to make an ajl-
proach towards sub-regional issues回therthan towards the complex 
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affairs of the entire Pacific region. 
Of the various practical tasks that an OPT AD 即位tundertake, it 
seems to me也atthe most urgent issue is the successful resolution of the 
North-Sou吐1ー thench nation-poor nat10n -problem in the Pacific 
region. Efforts to resolve this dilemma on a global basis within the 
framework of such organizations as the Umted Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the United Nations Industrial 
Development Organization (UNIDO) have proved unrealistic and fruit-
les. The differences among也evarious regional groups -the Asian 
group as opposed to the African group is a case in po担t simply have 
been too great to permit any workable agreements. The lesson, I think, 
is clear. Only those nations曲目 havean intimate knowledge of白e
particular regional and sub-regional economic issues are able to contri-
bute to effechve solutions, and this kmd of a group泊EC阻 mostsuitably 
be arranged by an OPTAD. 
While it is clear that al the various nations of the region stand to 
profit from the format10n of an OPT AD, it 1s les clear just how organiza-
tional efforts should proceed. The five advanced nations might be ex-
pected to take the initiative, but that co叫dprove intimidating to some 
of世田likelyparticipants. A desirable alternative would be for ASEAN, 
a group with considerable stake in any such venture, to tはethe initiative 
and establish an ASEAN-Paclfic Forum, a sub-regional OPTAD mvolving 
the ASEAN nations and廿iefive advanced Pacific nations. Once opera-
tional, it could mvite the parhc1pation of吐田othernalions ~f the region, 
eventually t阻nsfo口ningitself into a fully regional organization. Should, 
on the other hand, the creat10n of a smgle, region-wide orga凶zation
somehow prove to be too difficult a task, a series of separate, sub-
reg10nal groups, each with the five advanced nat10ns as members, could 
be formed Thus, there could be an East Asia-Pacific Forum, a Pacific 
Islands-Pacific Forum, and even a Latin Amencan-Pacific Forum to 
complement the ASEAN-Pacific Forum. Although it would be desirable 
for China to participate m the East Asia-Pacific Forum, the poss1b出tyof 
organizmg stil another forum一世田 China-PacificForum -could be 
considered should it prove advisable. Indirect as it might be, such an 
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arrangement would stil produce iomt policy. 
Using the ASEAN-Pacific Forum as an example, I would like to sketch 
out how economic development and trade growth in the ASEAN nations 
would be accelerated. The primary target of such an organization would 
be to raise the levels of the ASEAN economies rapidly and efficiently 
through aid and direct ・investment from the advanced Pacific countries 
and吐rroughthe opening of wider markets for their products. In the final 
phase, the present ASEAN economies should have grown to an mdustri・
alized s阻geequivalent to that of the advanced Pacific countries and thus 
forge an mterdependent and equal relat10nship with the advanced nations 
similar to that of present-day Europe. 
Thus far al the advanced Pacific countries have insisted upon a 
btlateral approach with the ASEAN nat10ns in prov1dmg offic阻laid, 
making direct investments and a町四gingtrade preferences. However, if 
a regional-multilateral approach such as advocated here were to be put 
担toeffect, a larger and more efficient contribution to econonnc develop-
ment and trade growthおral parties could be anticipated. Equally 
import阻 t,the danger of over-presence and domination by one or an-
other of the advanced nations, ever present under existing bilateral 
relationships, would be avoided. In addition, as the following suggestions 
illustrate, a number of more spec1白cbenefits nnght also be realized 
I) Official development aid to the area could be pooled and used in a 
multilateral “no-strings＇’fashion through the creation of a “revolving 
aid fund ”Annual aid comnntinents from the five advanced Pac出c
countries could be deposited with the Asian Development Bank to 
establish the fund. The scheme could be applied to official bilateral 
aid, including techrtlcaJ a田istance,sales加 receiptof local currency, 
and official export credits. Without requiring additional annual aid 
comm1tinents, the scheme could be made operational immediately. 
The object would be to work towards the removal of strings from 
bilateral aid to Sou甘ieastASian countnes. 
The “revolvmg aid fund" scheme involves the acceptance of two 
important principles. The白rstis that aid credited to the fund would 
have to be completely unfettered so far as procurements are con-
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cerned (i.e., procuremen臼 couldbe made in any donor country or 
any ASEAN country). The second Is that any pos1t1ve imbalance 
between a country’s sales under aid procurements and its aid com-
mitment should be held with the fund. The original deposits and 
accumulated deposits could not be withdrawn from the fund, but 
would be utilized by aid receivers in subsequent ye町s.To出ustrate,
suppo田 thatdonor country A provides $500 million worth of aid 
but only $400 m出ion担 spent,while donor country B provides 
$500 milhon but exports goods and services to the value of $600 
million to the recipient countries. Country B would accumulate a 
$100 million credit w1也吐iefund, raising its total to $600 million, 
while country A’s total would decline conuuensurately. Thus country 
B would have automatically increased its aid commitments by $100 
million in the second year Had the freeing of吐吐said taken place out-
side也efund, country B would have earned foreign exchange at 
country A’s expense The “revolvmg aid fund" obVJates this exchange 
problem, essentially because it requires that country B’s aid obligation 
increase automatically with excess earnings. The end result is that也e
ef免ctivenessof the total aid program would mcrease even though the 
副nountsinvolved remained unchanged 
The “revolving aid fund" scheme could be used for several other 
rmportant pu中ose丸山cedeposits would accumulate over time from 
the gap between annual aid commitments and disbursements (usually 
some 20 to 30 percent), and from deposits by “excess-exl'orters”Let 
me suggest four po阻 b出ties:
(a) ASEAN countries could be a田istedin their economic develop-
ment through a stabilization of export earnings (ST ABEX) scheme 
for certain primary products. Loans for compensation of export 
income losses, with v町ylow interest阻tes,could be provided from 
the fund. 
(b) Sub-regional buffer stocks in rice, timber and other products in 
which ASEAN countries have mtense叩 dconuuon interests could 
be created in order to stabilize prices and export earmngs relative 
to those products. The “revolving aid fund" could provide loans to 
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establish bufおrstock schemes when appropriate. 
(c) It IS important to stimulate the development of natural resourc白
in the Pacific region. The “revolving aid fund" could be used to 
supply low泊terestloans for research and the exploration for 
mineral resources, and also to proVIde internat10nal msurance 
coverage for private foreign investment 
(d) ASEAN exporters requ註eaccess to funds for export credit in 
order to proVIde terms which are competitive with those of ex-
porters m advanced count口es.The ability to provide e混portcredit 
to buyers, w1tlun and outside the region, wil become more import-
ant as the capacity for mdustnal exports grows The “revolving aid 
fund" could be used to provide export credit funds for the benefit 
of Southeast Asian countries. 
Perhaps I have dwelt too much upon technicalities relative to血e
“revolVIIlg aid fund" scheme but the fact is that, 1f coordinated pohcy 
actions are taken, there 1s room to fac血tatemassive sub-regional eco-
nomic development through such a de羽田．
The other m司orbenefits. of an ASEAN-Pacific Forum c四 becited 
more bnefly: 
2) Official development aid from the Pacific advanced countries to the 
ASEAN natrnns could be greatly enlarged. The aid should cover many 
projects, including ASEAN complementary lndust口eswhich have 
already been planned. In addition, new large-scale aid directed at such 
ends as doubling rice production and constructmg an ocean-transpor-
tation network, ought to be considered. 
3) J olnt venture investments and non-equity arrangement between ad-
vanced countnes and ASEAN countries could be encouraged for the 
development of mineral and other natural resources, for the establish-
ment of light consumer manu白ctunng,and for the creation of heavy 
industrial growth points (including ASEAN complementary泊dus-
tries). In al mstances, the pr句ectsshould be economically ef:白c1ent
and competitive. 
4) In order to improve market acce回 forASEAN product -both 
pnmary products and manufacturers -advanced countries have pro-
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vided generalized preferences on more generous terms and have 
reduced M.F.N. tarifs through GATT negotiations. These efforts 
have not been sufficient and must be much improved despite the fact 
that counteractions, such as the strengtherung of safeguard clauses, 
have recently app回目d In addition, structural adjustment in de-
veloped countries must be undertaken to nurture and encourage the 
expansion of ASEAN trade which wil come in response to吐盟、oomerangeffects" of past aid and泊vestJnent.Advanced countries 
must cooperate with respect to preferences and structural adjustment. 
If only one country establishes an open market policy, reduces tarifs, 
and undertakes preferences and structural adiustment, the export 
products from the developing economies would be directed at that 
country, thereby causmg a deterioration in its mternational balance 
of payments and in its level of employment. It is essential that al 
advanced countries cooperate in adopting at least vaguely sumlar open 
market pohcies. Common considerations of value-added tarifs and 
cumulative ASEAN contents should be given attention A cooperative 
policy is as essential here as it is in the case of domestic demand 
management and busmess recovery pohcy副nongadvanced countries 
It goes without田yingthat an ASEAN-Pacific Forum would provide 
the concerned nations with an avenue for dialogue on these matters. 
Pacific Region-wide Cooperation 
In addition to sub-regional economic development, there are a number 
of more general, reg10n-wide functions that an extended ASEAN-Pacific 
Forum or more broadly based OPTAD might perform. Some of the more 
nnportant are as follows. 
I. It is essential that the exchange of social and cultural knowledge 
be promoted in order to enhance mutual understanding among the 
diverse nations m the Pacific region and to create a basis for reg10nal 
sol!darity. An intensification of exchange in the areas of at least 
research, education, and personnel is neces岨ry
2 Technolog1cal progress m transportation and cornmunlcation has 
already facilitated increased reg10nal exchang白血theareas of culture, 
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personnel, products and mvestment Stil further developments, in-
cludmg an increase m tounsm, are awaited with the hope that ex-
panded volume will lower costs 
3 The Pacific has a great potential for the development of marme re-
sources, including fishing and seabed mining・Developmentin this 
area must, however, be undertaken with discipline and within a 
region”wide cooperative framework involvmg al the nations con-
cerned. 
4. It 1s important that efforts be made to secure adequate food supplies 
and to stabilizeおodpric田 throughoutthe Pacific basin. 
5. It is also important that secure, safe energy bases be established in 
the Pacific region.官tis担volvessuclt controversial matters as creat-
加ga regional joint oil stock, constructing an oil relay base, developing 
oil resources in the region, funding research on the commercial pro-
duction of alternative energy sources, and bu削inga regional nuclear 
energy recycling system 
6 Similar efforts must be made to assure the availability of other 
natural resources in the Pacific basin region 
7. All nations involved in these acfr吋tiesmust pay appropriate heed to 
questions of enviromnental protection. 
The list of concerns common to al the Pacific rim countries could go 
on endlessly. The point, however, 1s already clear. All these concerns 
have region-wide rather th阻 simplynational implications and their 
solutions are more likely to be found m region-wide efforts. We must, 
therefore, intensify our efforts泊 thatdrrection. 
(!) U S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affarrs, Heanngs Be-
fore the Subcomm白teeon Asian and Pacific Aβ'airs, 96th Cong , 
!st Ses巡回， 1979,p. !07. Hereafter cited as House, Hearings. 
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(2) Pacific Basin Cooperation Study Group, Interim Report on the 
Pacific Basin Cooperation Concept (Tokyo, Nov. 14, 1979), pp 2-3 
Final report was issued on May 19, 1980. 
(3) U.S Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, An Asian-
Pacific Regional Economic Organization: An Exploratory Concept 
Paper, 96th Cong, !st Sess, July 1979. 
(4) House Hearings, p. 44. 
